Normalizing Online Political Posting about the Thai Monarchy and the Lèse Majesté Law on prachatai.com: Promises and Pitfalls Part 1
Writer's note: Although the paper was finished in December 2009 and many things have occured since, especially the massive blocking of political websites by the ICT Ministry under the Emergency Decree and the decision by Prachatai to cease to operate its web board after much legal and political pressure, many critical discussions about the Thai monarchy institution continue on-line, although with increasing level of fear for posters' own safety and security.
The paper is about normalizing critical political-posting on Thai monarchy and lese majeste law, which was written while the writer was on a Katherine Fanning Fellowship for Journalism and Democracy at Kettering Foundation in Dayton, Ohio. It is still revelant given the continued thirst for discussion by a substantial number of Thai population and the writer hopes it will be of some interest and benefits to Thai society.
“[He] had never anticipated the networks, both human and electronic, that would call his vision into being by accelerating the act of communication and eliminating the constraints of space and time. The virtual domain we call cyberspace originated in the cold war laboratory’s bid to create a “closed world” visualized on computer screens and instantaneously responsive to human direction… Between the late 1960s and the early 1980s, long-haired renegades working within the bowels of a modern-day knowledge-power complex transformed the computer from a symbol of corporate regimentation into a technology facilitating personal expression and open collaboration.”
From ‘Reinventing Knowledge: From Alexandria to the Internet’, Ian F. McNeely and Lisa Wolverton. 2008, Norton, pp. 266-268.
“Most of the Thai journalists voice the same reverence for King Bhumibol as the vast majority of the population. The others are forced into self-censorship.”
Reporters Without Borders 2009 Annual Report on Thailand’s Press Freedom.
“ “Interactive” media are all well and good, but there does seem to be a recurring motif of pointlessly fulminating ping-pong, no matter what the subject at hand. Someone writes an article. Some readers like it, some readers don’t. At first they fling praise or invective at the author, but soon they’re calling one another political poopy-heads and snarling about who’s stupider than whom. Then it goes from being accusative in the singular (you’re an idiot) to the stereotyped plural (your kind are all idiots).”
Patricia J. Williams, ‘Nobel Peace Sparks War’, New York-based The Nation Magazine, Nov 9, 2009, p.9.
“All that online stuff degenerates into slanging matches within five messages on the message board.”
British writer Nick Hornby
“The ancient Greeks considered this the talk we use to teach ourselves before we act. Public deliberation is weighing possible courses of action to solve a problem against what people consider deeply important to their collective well-being.”
David Mathews, Kettering Foundation
“Some people conclude that thinking about these [philosophical] questions is a waste of time because agreement will never be reached. But a few people are exhilarated by the process of questioning, thinking about tentative answers, questioning deeper, and so on. Even if we don’t settle many of theses questions, the pocess brings us closer to understanding ourselves.”
Barry Loewer, Chair of the Philosophy Department, Rutgers University
The changing landscape in publicly talking about Thai monarchy
The mainstream Thai media practise widespread censorship and self-censorship regarding news and views critical of the Thai monarchy due to ideological reasons and the lèse majesté law. Although the law, under which any person defaming a member of the royal family faces up to 15 years imprisonment, makes almost impossible any really engaged and critical view in the mainstream media, the same cannot be said of online Internet discussion.
Some online posters, most using pennames, have entered the debate, despite the legal restrictions and the prevailing culture in which discussion is taboo and often treated as an act of disloyalty. As the age of Thailand’s King Bhumibol Adulyadej advances and his health continues frail, online critical discussion about the future role of the Thai monarchy has become even more widespread, despite the arrests of four internet posters in 2009 allegedly for involvement in speculation about the king’s health on web boards like prachatai.com. (see ‘Doctor nabbed over stock rumours’, The Nation, November 19, 2009). Internet sites such as prachatai.com are contributing to the opening and normalizing of critical discussion about the role of the monarchy in Thai society with mixed success.
Some think cyberspace is the new frontier of freedom of expression while others see it as a place where outrageous ranting and “subversive” views prevail. Whether one likes it or not, online political posting is probably here to stay as people increasingly use the Internet for its high-speed interconnectivity and as a virtual public space for sensitive political discussion. The question is whether discussion and debate in comments on news and commentaries on online political sites such as prachatai.com is a boon or bane to Thai democracy and freedom of expression. Can the quality and equality of the discussion and debate improve and can meaningful framing and naming of the issue be done without a moderator?
As the online crackdown and surveillance continue, so do the posting and debate. Despite the risk, online political posting remains the “safest” and perhaps the freest open public venue to talk critically about the Thai monarchy.
Why is open and critical discussion about the monarchy difficult?
Many Thais view the monarchy in a quasi-religious manner and want to maintain it as a sacred institution not open to honest, critical and free discussion, especially by those critical of the institution, because it interferes with their belief. Many people’s sense of belonging, security, pride, and identity has been attached to the notion of the monarchical institution and the dominant discourse about love and reverence for the king is repeated on a nearly daily basis through both state-controlled and mainstream corporate media. (For example, a December 1, 2009 news article on The Nation newspaper’s online version entitled “HM the King to grant audience on Dec 5”, which is the King’s birthday, refers to the “much beloved King” and the “much revered monarch” and added that “His Majesty’s speech is full of wisdom and useful advice for the country”.)
While the institution has become the anchor to which the emotions of many Thais are secured, more crucial is the conflation of the notion of ‘Thai-ness’ (kwam pen thai) or Thai identity with that of being loyal and proud of the monarchy. Royalism has become a defining characteristic of the elusive “unique Thai identity”.
The control over what does and does not constitute Thai-ness is about maintaining social control by the powers-that-be. Under the discourse of this social construct, those who are critical of the monarchy are often regarded as ‘un-Thai’, since every Thai ought to revere the monarchical institution. This is despite some scholarship which questions this neat dominant narrative. In this dominant narrative, the monarchical institution, especially the Chakri dynasty, has always ruled the kingdom for the common good in a benign and altruistic way, and all Thais have always loved and revered their kings, especially the current one.
On YouTube, where a number of videos have been blocked in Thailand for allegedly defaming the King, some people also express their love for the King in a way which is tied to their Thai identity. “I am pround [sic] to be Thai and have a great king,” wrote jansadud, in a posting following the YouTube video entitled ‘My response to the Thai King video controversy’ (accessed on December 2, 2009).
The monarchical institution has become the main source of national pride in a country which excels in little else. In a country where corrupt politicians are the norm rather than the exception, many people seek pride in the royal institution and regard it as benign and well above the often dirty and disgusting mundane political reality.
The almost daily positive-news-only and idealized portrayal of the monarchical institution helps popularize the dominant narrative and royalists have no doubts, and do not wish anyone to have doubts, about this dominant narrative.
Royalists display their reverence to the king in the most public and lavish ways possible, putting up huge portraits of the monarch, wearing yellow shirts to work (the colour of the King’s birthday), etc. Thai boxers upon winning international bouts almost without exception hold up a portrait of His Majesty the King in the moment of victory and a Thai mountain climber who scaled the summit of Mount Everest did the same. State-controlled television stations air the royal good deeds every weekday evening and mainstream newspapers publish ever bigger pictures of the King on his birthday which is also regarded by many as the de facto National Day as well as Father’s Day.
Gigantic billboards with images of the sovereign can be seen in Bangkok and other major cities. (One such billboard even declared the King to be “the King of Kings”.)
At Suvarnabhumi International Airport, the kingdom’s main aviation hub, signs retro-celebrating the king’s 80th anniversary were still up a year after the actual celebration. Many Thais seem to derive pride out of such exhibitions of loyalty and reverence just as it continues to astound, perplex or even worry others, not just abroad but domestically.
In a way, this royalist ethos is understandable as both state-controlled and mainstream corporate media seem caught up in a frenzy of competition to push the limits of flattery.
In early 2008, this writer recalled going to Bangkok’s Siriraj Hospital to cover the death of the King’s older sister and interviewed a few royalists at the hospital. One middle-aged woman told this writer in tears that the late Princess Galayani who had just passed away was such a good person. I then asked if she had ever met her. “No, but I often saw her doing good deeds on TV.”
Most Thais are not completely aware that most of their attachment to the royal family is in fact media-mediated, as few people have had any substantial contact with members of the royal family. However the media’s lavish and idealized portrayal of the royal family is what causes concern and even dissent among some Thais.
Nevertheless, royalists see any critical discussion of the royal family as blasphemous and profane and would prefer that their idealized version of the institution be left as it is. They want to recreate and relive royalist nostalgia where the sovereign’s relationship with its subjects is ever ideal.
Anyone openly critical of the monarchical institution is thus simply regarded as anti-monarchist and the two tend to be easily and conveniently conflated. A deep sense of insecurity and paranoia pervades some royalists who fear that open and critical discussion would inevitably lead to the eventual abolition of the monarchy. So some books are banned and some people are put in jail for openly “defaming” the royal institution. (See thaipoliticalprisoners.wordpress.com website for details).
Some royalists appear to believe that anyone critical of the monarchical institution, including the staff and many posters and writers on political news websites like prachatai.com, are also part of a large and sinister conspiracy led by convicted former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who was ousted in a 2006 military coup, in order to bring down the royal institution and turn the kingdom into a republic. Most of the people who are critical of the monarchy are conveniently lumped in with the pro-Thaksin red-shirt movement while those supporting the lèse majesté law and the monarchical institution are also often regarded merely as members of the jingoistic yellow-shirt People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), which further polarizes the conflict as the two colours do not see eye to eye.
As the lèse majesté law is about exerting social control and maintaining social order, the social construct of equating ‘Thai-ness’ with loyalty to the throne makes any critical remark a challenge to the establishment and the prevailing social order. These “deviants” must be persecuted or re-educated or at least suppressed, otherwise the elite would feel that their status quo is threatened. Threats to the monarchy, real or imagined, have been exploited as a mean of uniting people against what is perceived as a common internal enemy and this gives royalists a measure of focus.
Some of those opposing the lèse majesté law charge that there are some people who benefit from maintaining the current order and acting as “true royalists”, regardless of whether some of these people are genuine royalists or just opportunists. On the other hand, some of the so-called “anti-monarchists” could very well be opposing the institution for less than altruistic or ideological reasons. They may be in it for political expediency and their own gain. The issue became more acute when Thailand began to ponder the future of the throne after the current King, and some appear to be exploiting both royalist as well as anti-royalist sentiments. (For example, a PAD leader is alleged to have told old friends in private that he’s simply using royalist fever for political ends. Also, a sense of distrust prevails among anti-royalists that some red-shirt leaders may also eventually resort to using royalist ideology for their own benefit if and when the opportunity arises or if they are back in power.)
Somewhere in between, there also exist political bystanders who are not particularly pro or anti-monarchist and simply want to get on with life. It’s unclear how big this group is due to the legal constraints against embarking upon such a survey but, judging from common gossip and frank private talks, their numbers are definitely not negligible and they are often overlooked when foreign and local media too conveniently portray most Thais as revering the king. These Thais will simply bend with the wind, depending on the political direction of the day and are too pragmatic to be bothered, one way or the other. From the writer’s experience, it is not uncommon for reporters and editors in the mainstream media, which otherwise publicly reports only good and positive news about the royal institution, to be privately engaged in less than flattering gossip and critical discussion about the royal family. Such contradictions raise doubts about the accuracy of the public perception, as if there is a difference between persona and self, anthropologically speaking.
As for Thai human rights activists who ought, by virtue of their profession, to care about free speech and democracy, some are in fact true closet royalists, while others are too pragmatic to raise the issue; very few dare to openly criticize the lèse majesté law. Those who base their actions on political expediency must have concluded that they stand to lose more from openly criticizing the prevailing situation, and if they are bothered by it at all, they would try to deal with the matter behind the scenes in a diplomatic fashion. Some may have concluded that human rights in Thailand can survive despite the lèse majesté law and that there are other more pressing matters to attend to. The belief that the issue is a pre-occupation of the mostly Western-educated Thai middle class is insufficient in explaining why many formally less-educated working class members of the red-shirt movement appear to be critical of the institution.
On the other hand, those opposed to the lèse majesté law, regarding it as inherently unjust and undemocratic, and critical of the institution, are appalled by the mainstream mass media’s incessant praise and idealization of the monarchy and the concomitant media censorship and self-censorship. As the current reign draws closer to an end, and a sense of uncertainty prevails, the mainstream media appear to be further elevating the idealized image of the monarchy. Critics of the law think the negative repercussions on democracy and freedom of expression are severe, to say the least.
Opponents see the restrictions imposed by the lèse majesté law, and increasingly the computer crimes law, as the most fundamental impediment to free speech, equality, transparency and democracy. They are appalled by the fact that people cannot even speak openly and critically in public about such a key institution without risking persecution. In this context, using the word ‘propaganda’, for example, could land one in jail. Spreading rumours about the king’s health has also become a crime, as witnessed by the arrests of four Thais in November 2009. This repressive climate only makes these people more bitter and frustrated and negatively affects their view of the elite and the powers-that-be.
They are concerned that the never-ending and exasperating flattery of the monarchy and the growing number of arrests under the lèse majesté law and computer crimes law are making society more repressive and undemocratic. These people observe with concern the retreat of press freedom and critical space as the mainstream mass media morphs into a royalist PR tool. Less than a hundred years ago, during the reign of King Rama VII, the Thai print media were rather censorious and at times openly criticized the monarch despite the fact that the King at that time was not even a constitutional monarch but an absolute monarch. Many young Thai journalists today are not even aware of this.
Those critical of the monarchical institution are aware that the thought police are out there reading and monitoring online postings and yet can’t help putting out their views even though it is mostly done under pennames or anonymously. Some feel as if they have become political prisoners even without being physically in jail, as they cannot express their political ideas freely, thus making them de facto prisoners of conscience.
They are concerned at the possible repercussions for open and critical thought when Thais are taught and required to regard the institution only in an idealized form and more and more praise is fed into the collective consciousness. Even God in most Christian/western societies can be questioned and be the subject of criticism. Since Thailand is not North Korea or Cuba, the issue is not as clear cut and is more nuanced, yet the alienation and oppression felt by these people are real and foreign human rights advocates who suggest that they can and should get by without freedom of expression in this regard are not received well. It’s like telling African Americans that they can and should continue to get by in life without seeking racial equality. And of course, one can get by, but not as complete humans and citizens with equal rights.
In a larger context, some opponents of the lèse majesté law have also developed a counter-narrative about the monarchical institution and its role in Thai society in opposition to the dominant and idealized narrative incessantly disseminated by the state-controlled and mainstream media and school textbooks. They see the dominant narrative as far from accurate. And they wonder how a society which cannot openly discuss the monarchy can find a compromise or solution. Different parties appear not to want to understand one another. It must be noted that both royalists and anti-monarchists have not tried to put themselves into the others’ shoes and each side thinks the problem is with the other side.
While royalists are regarded as both victims and oppressors by those critical of or opposed to the monarchical institution, many royalists regard these people as un-Thai and ungrateful. Some online posters suggest those critical of the monarchy should simply shut up, go into exile, eat hamburgers and become American.
To be continued on Part 2



Comments
Yes, that brings us up to the
Yes, that brings us up to the present, more or less. Awaiting part 2.
Activists air new
Activists air new doubts
Criticizing Siam Cement Group? I wonder if there aren't grounds there for lèse majesté prosecution?